Avnon Group | Defence & Security Insights
Why effective border security requires more than monitoring the border line.
Across the Sahel, the expansion of armed extremist activity is placing growing pressure on neighbouring West African states. For countries such as Benin and Togo, the challenge extends beyond securing individual border crossings. It also involves understanding developments across extensive and often difficult-to-monitor territories.
This changes the questions governments must consider when planning border security programmes. Success cannot be measured only by the kilometres monitored or the quantity of equipment deployed. Security authorities must also consider how information is gathered, shared and sustained across the wider area of responsibility.
The northern border, in other words, is a question of depth as well as distance.
What Is Changing in the Sahel
Reporting in October 2026 described intensified fighting between Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province in the Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger borderlands, with clashes from around 9 October (Africanews/AFP). An earlier UN expert assessment had characterised the rivalry as an exceptionally intense confrontation between the two extremist networks.
The pressure is also visible further south. ACLED examined the borderlands of Benin’s Alibori and Borgou departments, Niger’s Dosso department and Nigeria’s Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger and Kwara states. Across those regions, violent events involving jihadist groups rose by 86% between 2024 and 2025, and associated fatalities by 262%. ACLED describes a shift towards entrenchment, with forest belts and protected reserves serving as base areas, and control of smuggling and river trade routes tying local livelihoods to militant presence.
Benin’s armed forces have been directly affected. The government reported 54 soldiers killed in a JNIM-claimed attack in April 2025 (Qatar Tribune/DPA), and the army reported 15 soldiers killed at a military position in Kofonou in March 2026 (RFI via AllAfrica).
Security pressures extend beyond the central Sahel
Togo’s northern Savanes region has been under a state of emergency since June 2022. In February 2026 the National Assembly approved a fourth consecutive 12-month extension, citing the cross-border threat on the northern frontier (Timbuktu Institute).
Ghana’s situation is different, but its armed forces are watching closely. In July 2026 the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt Gen William Agyapong, said extremist groups had “penetrated the northern belt of our neighbours to the north and are probing further south”, describing the situation as a “planning priority” rather than an alarmist claim (MyJoyOnline).
Regional governments therefore face the challenge of planning for multiple security scenarios, including the possibility of further geographic expansion and changes in militant activity.
Why Border-Line Thinking Is Not Enough
The W, Arly and Pendjari parks illustrate the challenge. The cross-border complex covers about 34,000 square kilometres of Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger. Africa Defense Forum reports limited state presence, porous borders and smuggling routes through the area, and documents JNIM hideouts there. The point is not that armed groups control the whole territory. It is that extensive, remote and environmentally complex terrain is difficult for any state to monitor consistently.
In such environments, monitoring crossing points remains necessary but is unlikely to be sufficient on its own. Developments that matter for border security can take shape across territory that lies between and behind formal crossings.
Fixed observation posts can remain important components of border security, but their effectiveness depends on how they are supported by information, communications, appropriate safeguards and wider institutional coordination. The regional environment is also changing: ADF reports explosive-drone activity in the broader tri-border area in March 2025, one more factor authorities now weigh when assessing risk.
The argument is therefore not the line versus depth. Border monitoring is one part of a wider approach that also involves situational awareness, information management, coordination and sustainable operational support.
Three Tests for Border Security Programmes
Three tests can help governments and their partners judge whether a programme addresses depth as well as distance. They are evaluation criteria, not guarantees of success.
Test 1 – Situational Awareness
Does the programme help authorised decision-makers develop a reliable understanding of the wider area of responsibility?
The number of kilometres covered is an input, not an outcome. What matters is the quality of the information, coverage suited to the terrain and the risk, interoperability between systems, and an understanding of the operating environment, including legitimate civilian activity such as cross-border trade and seasonal movement.
Test 2 – Information and Coordination
Can information from relevant systems and organisations support informed, timely and coordinated decisions?
Border security usually involves several institutions: armed forces, police, customs and local authorities, and sometimes neighbouring states. ACLED identifies weakened regional coordination as one of the factors behind the borderland escalation. Information creates value only when it is shared with appropriate access controls, across interoperable systems, between institutions with clear responsibilities.
Test 3 – Long-Term Operational Sustainability
Will the personnel, infrastructure, maintenance and financial resources required to sustain the programme remain available over time?
Remote sites bring practical demands: power, spare parts, maintenance, training, local capacity and continuity of support, with lifecycle costs that outlast initial funding. Long-term sustainment deserves the same attention as system capabilities during procurement. Without a credible plan for maintenance, training and support, even advanced systems may struggle to deliver lasting value.
Legal safeguards, responsible data handling and the impact on communities whose livelihoods depend on legitimate cross-border movement should also be considered from the outset. No single surveillance architecture guarantees effective border protection; the objective is to build a programme that fits national requirements, institutional responsibilities and the realities of the operating environment.
The Importance of Integrated Capabilities
Complex security requirements rarely depend on a single technology. They require a coordinated approach to information, systems integration and long-term programme delivery.
Within the Avnon ecosystem, specialist companies address different parts of that requirement — from persistent surveillance and unmanned systems to integration, programme delivery and lifecycle support. BeeSense develops integrated multi-sensor surveillance and force-protection solutions for border security, critical infrastructure and demanding operational environments. iSTAR specialises in the engineering, integration and manufacture of unmanned aircraft systems. TAR brings mission-led programme delivery and systems integration capability, combining technology selection, configuration, integration, training and lifecycle support around the operational requirement.
Together, these capabilities reflect Avnon Group’s broader approach: addressing customer requirements through complementary expertise rather than isolated technologies.
Beyond the Border Line
The evolving security situation across the Sahel highlights the importance of approaching border security as a broader institutional and operational challenge.
Effective programmes require more than individual surveillance assets. They depend on reliable information, coordinated decision-making, appropriate technology and the ability to sustain capabilities over time.
For governments weighing future security investments, the lasting measure of a programme is not the equipment delivered at the outset. It is the enduring value it creates within national institutions: capabilities they can operate, coordinate and sustain long after the initial delivery.
Talk to Avnon Group about integrated defence and border-security programme requirements.
Sources
- ACLED: Why is jihadist violence escalating in the Benin, Niger and Nigeria border triangle? (26 Feb 2026)
- Africanews/AFP: Rival Sahel jihadists clash in intensifying turf war (16 Oct 2026)
- Africa Defense Forum: Parks complex becoming a hive of insecurity (1 Apr 2025)
- Timbuktu Institute: Togo, between a state of emergency and resilience under pressure (10 Mar 2026)
- MyJoyOnline: Sahel extremist groups pushing south toward Ghana, CDS warns (1 Jul 2026)
- Qatar Tribune/DPA: Benin says 54 soldiers killed by al-Qaeda affiliate (25 Apr 2025)
- RFI via AllAfrica: Quinze militaires tués dans une attaque du JNIM dans le nord du Bénin (6 Mar 2026)